. The distinguishing element of these decentralized institutions -the existence of a means of certifying compliance with a set of practices -has been little considered. When it has been addressed at all, certification has been used as simply a convenient mechanism for measuring the adoption of the specified practices (Corbett & Kirsch, 2001; Delmas, 2002; Guler et al, 2002) . Only a few pioneering studies have argued that certification might influence the function of management standards (Anderson, Daly, & Johnson, 1999; Jiang & Bansal, 2003) .
In this article, we extend theory by directly evaluating certification as a critical determinant of the function of management standards. Drawing on previous research, we observe that asymmetrically distributed information can harm all parties to an exchange (Akerlof, 1970) . We propose that the symbolic act of certifying with a management standard reveals credible information about otherwise hidden organizational attributes and behaviors.
Choosing whether to employ this symbolic act, we argue, entails strategic consideration of the information needs and strategies of other actors. Consistent with this logic, we hypothesize that managers will be more likely to seek certification when they expect potential exchange partners to lack information or fear opportunism. We further hypothesize that certification reveals credible information about the use of particular management systems, efforts at performance improvement, or the organization's performance relative to others.
Empirically, we explore certification with the ISO 14001 environmental management standard. Sponsored by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the ISO 14001 standard specifies a set of environmental management systems and practices, including the development of environmental objectives and policies, the provision of training and documentation, delegation of responsibilities, and internal performance audits (Delmas, 2002) .
It also creates a system for third-party auditors to certify compliance with the standard.
The choice of ISO 14001 as the setting for our research has three important advantages.
First, due to the availability of government data on firm environmental practices, we can better separate factors that influence the adoption of environmental management systems and practices from those that influence the decision to certify with ISO 14001. Second, the standard is applicable to a diverse group of organizations, thereby allowing a comparison of adoption across numerous firms, industries, and regulatory settings. Finally, the practical impact of ISO 14001 remains a source of interest and discussion. In testimony before the U.S. Congress, members of the standard setting committee expressed differing expectations about its function. Some suggested that certification would help "to distinguish companies that are doing the bare minimum from those that are committed to environmental excellence"; while others suggested that the program might provide direct operational advantages (Collins, 1996; Morella, 1996) .
THEORY & HYPOTHESES
Certified management standards include two fundamental elements. First, they codify a set of standard practices. Second, they provide a certification system that allows organizations to communicate the use of these practices. Most analyses of certified management standards have conflated the adoption of management practices and certification (Corbett & Kirsch, 2001; Delmas, 2002; Guler, Guillen, & Macpherson, 2002) . While it seems reasonable that certification indeed reflects the adoption of specified practices, the opposite logic does not hold.
Firms that do not certify may still adopt some or all of the practices. Adoption is an internal act which can be kept secret and private. Certification, in contrast, is a fundamentally public act because it entails submitting to an independent and public audit.
We theorize that firms use the public act of certification to reduce information asymmetries between suppliers and potential buyers. Asymmetric information -the condition where information about an exchange is distributed unequally -often harms all parties to that exchange (informed and uninformed alike). Akerlof (1970) illustrated this result with an example from used-car sales. He envisioned a market in which sellers knew the quality of their vehicles but buyers did not. He hypothesized that if buyers could not acquire credible information, they would be unwilling to pay more for (reportedly) high quality cars. Sellers, he argued, would then have no incentive to provide high quality vehicles and would withdraw them from the market.
Akerlof considered a case where asymmetric information makes it hard for buyers to identify desirable suppliers -thus creating what is termed a "selection problem". A second type of asymmetric information problem, the "monitoring problem", occurs when asymmetric information makes it difficult to know if agreements have been met. For example, Ford Motor
Company was unable to observe whether Bridgestone-Firestone was maintaining the process controls necessary to ensure that their tires would not fail when used (O'Rourke, 2001) .
Breakdown in quality management practices during a strike at one plant led to the production of faulty tires and resulted in severe losses for both companies (O'Rourke, 2001 ).
Observation of responses to both the selection and the monitoring problem provide interesting insights into strategic behavior because their solution may require the informed party to consider the information needs and opportunism concerns of the less-informed party and take action to alleviate these problems. We elaborate some possible elements of this strategic behavior in the section below. We hypothesize that suppliers will be more likely to certify when buyers 1) are less able to acquire information about the supplier or 2) have greater reason to fear opportunistic behavior on the part of the supplier. We further hypothesize that certification will provide credible and valuable information to buyers, and we hypothesize what this information might be.
Asymmetric Information and Opportunism
A common finding across many literatures is that exchange partners are likely to have less information about parties that are more physically distant (Allen, Lee, & Tushman, 1980; Hamilton, Godfrey & Linge, 1979; Katz & Tushman, 1979) . Distance reduces information transfer through its direct effect on transfer costs and by its association with other restricting factors (Mariotti & Piscitello, 1995) . For example, distance may reduce the number of shared information links and so prevent receiving parties from checking the veracity of information through redundant sources (Lane & Bachman, 1996) . Distance may also reduce the frequency of interaction and so reduce the propensity of parties to develop a reputation as a credible source (King, 1999) . Empirically, numerous studies in various social settings have documented that the transfer of credible information between two parties decreases rapidly with increasing physical distance (Allen et al, 1980; Hamilton et al, 1979) . Given the propensity for physical distance to reduce information transfer and increase asymmetric information, we expect:
The more an organization's potential buyers are physically distant, the greater the propensity for the organization to certify with the ISO 14001 management standard.
Aside from physical distance, social, cultural, and institutional distance can reduce information transfer and increase information asymmetries (Caves, 1982) . One explanation is that a shared culture or belief system facilitates the processing of transferred information (Hofstede, 1980) . Studies have shown that cultural and physical distance increases the difficulty and cost of selecting and monitoring foreign suppliers (Buckley & Casson, 1979; Hamilton et al., 1979; Kogut & Singh, 1988) . Such "liability of foreignness" is one of the central tenants of international business theory (Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998) . Following this tradition, we argue that information asymmetries should be especially high in international supply relationships.
H2:
The more an organization's potential buyers are located in foreign countries, the greater the propensity for the organization to certify with the ISO 14001 management standard.
Transaction cost theory suggests that firms structure relations with their buyers to reduce the threat of opportunism. Yet, as demonstrated by Argyres & Liebeskind (1999) , firms are usually constrained to choose a single governance structure for a set of transactions, and these structures are often sub-optimal for part of the set (e.g. ancillary or future transactions). For example, relationship specific assets at a buyer may increase the risk of supplier holdup and thus encourage the use of a long term supply contract with a supplier. Once in place, however, this contract may increase the threat of other types of opportunism (Grossman & Hart, 1986) . For example, suppliers with a long term contract may no longer be motivated to improve their performance because they are no longer disciplined by the high powered incentives of market competition (Williamson, 1985; Rotemberg, 1991) . Since supplier environmental performance is unlikely to be the driver of governance structures, we hypothesize that ongoing vertical relationship 1 between a buyer and a supplier will increase the risk of supplier moral hazard and thereby raise the need for buyers to monitor the supplier's environmental performance. In 1 Joskow (1988) coined the term "vertical relationships" to capture both vertical integration and long term contracts between suppliers and buyers. He showed that such relationships occurred more frequently when suppliers or buyers needed to invest in relationship specific assets and therefore could not easily switch to new exchange partners (Joskow, 1988; Williamson, 1985) .
addition, an ongoing relationship will increase the impact of such moral hazard by raising the spillover damage to the buyer's reputation.
The greater managerial authority provided in vertical relations might be presumed to facilitate this necessary monitoring. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that the monitoring benefits of vertical integration are often small and contingent (Zenger & Hesterly, 1997) . Eccles and White (1988) discovered that buyers prefer outside suppliers because intrafirm suppliers are thought to make lower quality goods. Lafontaine & Masten (2002) found that monitoring difficulties prevented trucking companies from using contracts with company drivers that might have induced them to choose the best routes. In their review of the literature, Zenger & Hesterly (1997) argue that vertical integration has allowed superior monitoring in only a few large organizations. Thus, research suggests that on net, ongoing vertical relationships increase the need for monitoring and the benefits to certification for both parties.
H3:
The more an organization has ongoing vertical relationships with its buyers, the greater the propensity for the organization to certify with the ISO 14001 management standard.
Information Content of Certification
Our proposition that certification serves as a vehicle to solve information asymmetries with exchange partners assumes that certification provides some real information about an organization. Thus, at the least, our theory requires that the symbolic act of certification remains coupled to the actual implementation of the prescribed practices. Numerous researchers have
shown that the decoupling of symbol from substance represents a real risk for norm-like institutions. For example, Westphal and Zajac (1994) found that the symbolic adoption of longterm incentive programs was disconnected from the actual use of these incentives; in a later study, they found similar decoupling for stock repurchase programs (Westphal & Zajac, 2001 (Jiang & Bansal, 2003) . Such systems may directly facilitate improvement; they may change incentives of agents within the organization and alter their behavior (Grossman & Hart, 1996) ; or they may reveal underlying organizational differences in improvement preferences.
Certification cannot reveal precisely when an organization has adopted an environmental system. Organizations may adopt an EMS and then later seek certification to convey this information to exchange partners. Alternatively, they may adopt or substantively modify an EMS to gain certification. Without knowing the extent of knowledge possessed by exchange partners, our theory cannot stipulate whether certification reveals information about the existence of a previously adopted performance improving EMS, or reveals information about a recently adopted or enhanced EMS. If certification is used to monitor improvement among exchange partners, however, it must provide one of these two types of information. To the extent that certification provides the former information, we should expect the existence of an EMS to be associated with performance maintenance or improvement, and that (as hypothesized in H4) certification with ISO 14001 reveals the existence of this EMS. To the extent that certification provides the latter information, we should expect to see that ISO 14001 certification is itself associated with performance maintenance or improvement.
H5a: An organization's environmental performance will improve following adoption of an environmental management system (EMS).
H5b: An organization's environmental performance will improve following certification with the ISO 14001 management standard.
As an alternative to helping buyers monitor whether suppliers improve, certified management standards may help firms communicate relatively superior underlying performance (Ferguson, 1996) . Spence (1973) provides one explanation for how certification could be a signal of superior but unobservable performance. Illustrating his idea with an example from education, Spence (1973) argues that a college diploma can help distinguish high productivity workers from low productivity workers -even if attending college has no effect on this productivity. He reasons that people that know they are highly productive may gain a diploma simply to differentiate themselves. He shows that a college diploma will provide a credible signal of unobservable productivity if two basic conditions are met: 1) attending college is more expensive (effort and money) for low productivity workers, and 2) employers offer a wage premium for college educated workers that is sufficient to offset the cost of going to college for high productivity workers but insufficient to offset the cost for low productivity ones.
Spence's model can be directly extended to certification with a management standard. If certification requires less effort and cost for high performers, and if buyers are willing to pay a premium to suppliers with better environmental performance, higher performers may choose to certify to signal their superior performance. Empirical research provides evidence that the conditions in many industries may allow ISO 14001 to act as a credible signal. Evidence exists that it is less costly for organizations with better environmental performance to acquire environmental management systems and certify with ISO 14001. Darnall & Edwards (2004) find that organizations with existing pollution prevention activities and greater management system experience can adopt environmental management systems at lower cost. Russo & Fouts (1997) suggest that organizational capabilities are closely tied to environmental performance, and that organizations with greater capabilities can more easily adopt proactive environmental management practices. Ferrer, Gavronski, & de Laureano (2003) find that a majority of managers believed that firms with better environmental performance could obtain ISO 14001 certification more cheaply than laggards. Numerous authors have argued that buyers are often willing to pay a premium to suppliers with higher environmental performance (c.f. Reinhardt, 1997) . Several explanations for this premium have been given. Environmental performance may provide evidence of superior operational performance (Russo & Fouts, 1997) .
Environmental accidents can cause substantial shortages of important input materials (Slawsky, 2004) . Environmental problems at supplying organizations can also damage the reputation of supply chain partners (Reinhardt, 1997) .
If organizations use certification as a signal of superior performance, those with high performance should tend to certify. According to Spence's signaling theory, no equilibrium can exist in which low performing suppliers (or all suppliers) certify, because this would destroy the credibility of the signal. Thus, if certified management standards act as a signal, and if we observe any certification at all, we should expect higher performing organizations to have a greater tendency to certify.
H6: Organizations that certify with the ISO 14001 management standard will have higher environmental performance than non-certifiers.

DATA & METHOD
We test our hypotheses by examining a sample of 7899 facilities (46052 observations 
Measures
Dependent variable. The primary dependent variable for our analysis is certification with the ISO 14001 environmental management standard. We gathered certification data from the QSU database of ISO 14001 certified facilities (QSU, 2002a) . Certification occurs at the facility level. We coded ISO 14001 Certification as a binary variable that takes on a value of one if a facility is ISO 14001 certified during a particular annual period.
Independent variables.
To test Hypothesis 1, we measured the geographic distance from a facility to the nearest major buyer (Distance to Buyers). To calculate this distance, we first used TRI data to gather longitude and latitude information for each facility. We then used the BEA input-output tables to determine the major (largest percentage) buying industry for each selling industry. For each supplying facility (identified by its 4 digit SIC code), we calculated the great circle distance (in miles) to the nearest member of this buying industry. We took the natural log of this measure to reduce its skew.
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To test Hypothesis 2, we measured the degree to which facilities in an industry sell to buyers outside of the United States (Foreign Buyers). Foreign Buyers measures the percentage of all goods produced by members of an industry that are shipped to buyers outside of the U.S.
We used Input-Output data from the BEA to create this variable.
2 To ensure the robustness of this measure, we also calculated an alternative variable that measured the number of such buyers within a 50 mile radius of the facility. Analysis using the natural log of this count variable confirmed the sign and significance of our results.
To test Hypothesis 3, we created two measures of the degree to which an organization has ongoing vertical relationships with its buyers. The first variable captures whether a firm is vertically integrated with at least one of its potential buyers (Vertically-Integrated Buyer). To form this measure, we created a binary variable that takes on a value of "1" if a supplier and a potential buyer (as determined by the BEA input-output tables) is owned by the same corporate parent as the focal facility. Our second measure captures industry-level differences in the propensity of suppliers to have vertical relationships with their buyers (Industry Vertical Relationship). Research has revealed that industry-level differences strongly influence the tendency for relationship specific investments (Maddigan, 1981) . To create a measure of this tendency, we adopted a method similar to that developed by Maddigan (1981) and Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt (1986) . First, we used data from the BEA to identify pairs of supplying and buying industries. For each supplying industry, we then used the entire 1996 D&B database (500,000 facilities) to calculate the percentage of suppliers that were owned by a corporation that also owned a facility in the buying industry. Because the volume of exchanges between industries differs widely, we weighted this percentage using shipment data from the BEA inputoutput tables. To reduce the skew of our final variable, we logged this weighted percentage value. Thus, Industry Vertical Relationship estimates the log percentage of any dollar produced by each industry (SIC code) that is shipped to a vertically integrated buyer.
To test Hypothesis 4, we use data from the toxic release inventory to estimate the existence of a functioning environmental management system. Since 1991, as part of their annual TRI submission, facilities have reported changes they have made to the production processes that could reduce waste or control pollution. Facilities also report the sources of these technical changes. We coded EMS as a binary variable that takes on a value of "1" if these sources provide evidence of a functioning environmental management system. Sources of changes that indicated evidence of an operating EMS are: (1) internal pollution prevention opportunity audits, (2) materials balance audits, (3) participative team management, and (4) employee recommendations under a formal company program.
To test Hypotheses 5 and 6, we calculated a facility's environmental performance using the King & Lenox (2000) method of estimating relative pollution among facilities in an industry.
Environmental Performance is measured as the standardized residual, or deviation, between observed and predicted waste generation given the facility's size and industry sector.
where W it is the toxicity weighted sum of all Toxic Release Inventory waste generated by facility i in year t, s it is facility size, and α jt ,β 1jt , and β 2jt are the estimated coefficients for industry sector j in year t. Following previous research, toxicity is measured using the inverse of CERCLA reportable quantities (King & Lenox, 2000) . Size is measured using the estimated number of employees working at facility i in year t. We reversed the sign of the residual to reflect the fact that more waste than predicted for a facility represents lower environmental performance.
Control Variables.
We created measures to control for some rival explanations for why firms certify with a management standard. Experience with related management standards could reduce the cost of certification or increases awareness of potential benefits. Institutional coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures could encourage certification. Finally, some facility and corporate characteristics might be an important factor.
Experience with related management practices and standards has been shown to influence the tendency for an organization to certify with ISO 14001 (King & Lenox, 2001 This binary variable takes a value of "1" if the facility sent any waste material to a POTW in that year. Industry Waste Generation measures the degree to which an industry generates toxic waste (and thus is likely to be the target of regulation and stakeholder pressure). It is measured as the mean of the log of the toxicity weighted waste generation for all facilities within each 4-digit SIC code. Research has shown that local stakeholder pressure is related to the affluence of the surrounding community (Walsh, Rex & Smith, 1993) . To measure the Affluence of the local populace, we calculated the annual average local income using IRS data in the facility's 5-digit zip code area. Finally, scholars have argued that the Responsible Care initiative could reduce stakeholder pressure on an industry by reducing the likelihood of regulatory action (King & Lenox, 2000) . To control for this potential effect we also measured the annual percentage of the facilities in the industry (RC Industry) that participate in the Responsible Care initiative.
Mimetic processes could also influence the propensity of firms to certify with the ISO 14001 management standard (Scott, 1995) . We control for such pressure in two ways. First, we use year fixed effects to capture any general temporal change in our sample -including cross industry diffusion pressures. Second, we measure the extent of diffusion within each industry (4-digit SIC code) to capture industry specific diffusion differences. For each year, this variable (Diffusion of ISO 14K) is measured as the percentage of facilities in our sample of that industry that are certified with ISO 14001.
Foreign corporations may use certification as a means of monitoring the behavior of their overseas facilities. Using D&B's Who-Owns-Whom or individual investigation of companies unlisted in this dataset, we created a binary variable that measures whether a U.S. facility is owned by a foreign parent (Foreign Owned). We coded the variable Foreign Owned to be "1" if the ultimate parent firm is non-U.S. owned, "0" if it is U.S. owned.
The size of a facility and the firm to which it belongs could influence the propensity to certify. We measured Facility Size as the normalized (by industry and year) log of the number of employees at that facility. Size is calculated using Dun and Bradstreet data for 1994 and 1997.
Missing years are estimated using TRI reports of year to year production changes. For example, a 10% higher production in 1998 results in a 10% increase in our size measure. We measure Firm Size as the annual count of the number of facilities owned by the target facility's parent.
The count is logged to reduce the skew of the distribution. correlations.
-
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Method
To test our hypotheses that firms certify when they expect buyers to have greater need for information or to have a greater propensity to fear opportunism, we conducted two different analyses of the factors influencing the propensity to certify with the ISO 14001 standard. As a first test, we analyze the full panel using a discrete time random effect probit model. For each facility, we predict certification with ISO 14001. As soon as a facility is certified, it is no longer at risk to certify, and we remove it from the sample. The model is specified as:
where P is the probability that facility i will certify with ISO 14001 in the next year (t+1). The vector X it represents the characteristics of the i th facility in year t. The facility random effects are measured as a i 3 .
The probit analysis allows us to use the full power of our panel data, but it does not allow us to separate the factors that lead to certification from those that lead to practice adoption (and might thereby influence certification). It is likely that some factors influence both the decision to adopt an EMS and to certify with ISO 14001. If measures for some of these factors are missing (e.g. an organization's culture), coefficient estimates from our one-stage panel analysis may be biased, even if the analysis includes a measure of EMS adoption. Unfortunately, how to correct for such endogeneity in panel analysis remains a largely unsolved problem, and robust solutions are generally restricted to panels of only two periods (Honore & Kyriazidou, 2000) . Following previous scholars, we chose to restrict our analysis to a cross section of our panel data and implement the approach developed by van de Ven and van Praag (1981) . This method uses a 3 Although the assumptions required for a random effects specification are not met, this is the most conservative model we can specify. A fixed effect model would disregard all observations that do not certify with ISO 14001 within our panel. Furthermore, a fixed effect specification would prohibit the interpretation of any variables with values that do not vary across groups (or time). To investigate the robustness of our model specification, we also employed a maximum likelihood proportional hazard model (with an exponential base-line hazard) and a Cox's nonparametric partial-likelihood estimation procedure. We obtained results that are consistent in sign and significance to those presented.
probit regression to estimate a selection model (adoption of an EMS) and a second probit regression to estimate a choice model (certification with ISO 14001).
where B & Z are separate coefficient vectors and x i is our set of explanatory variables. The two disturbance terms υ 1i and υ 2i are assumed to be bivariate normally distributed but correlated ρ. 
where i indexes the facilities, y ij,t+1 is the facility's environmental performance, Β is a vector of estimated coefficients, x i is a vector of measured facility level attributes, δ i is dummy variable capturing unmeasured facility fixed attributes, and ε it is the error term. Because of the lagged dependent variable, this formulation is prone to autocorrelation. We use a method developed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) to correct for this potential problem. Table 2 presents our analysis of certification with the ISO 14001 environmental management standard. Since our sample is large and thus may inflate the likelihood to reject the null hypothesis, we report significance only for p < 0.01 and p < 0.001 (Sterne & Smith, 2001 ).
ANALYSIS & RESULTS
Model 1 presents our discrete time random-effect probit specification for the period 1995-2001.
Model 2 presents a probit analysis of cross-section data from the year 1995. Model 3 addresses the potential sample selection problem by separating the factors that led to EMS practice adoption from those that led to certification. The first column of Model 3 reports estimates of the factors that influenced a facility's propensity to have reported a functioning EMS prior to 1995. The second column reports estimates of the factors (as measured in 1995) that affected the propensity to certify with ISO 14001 standard before the end of our sample (2002) . Due to the structure of the selection correction technique, the second stage estimates are based on data from those facilities that had reported an EMS prior to 1995 (reducing our sample to 3300 facilities). Table 2 
about here -------------------------------------------------------------------
Testing Our Hypotheses
Across the three models of ISO 14001 certification, we find support for our first two hypotheses. In all three models, we find evidence that the propensity for a facility to certify with ISO 14001 increases with greater physical distance to potential buyers (H1). We find moderate support for the effect of foreign buyers on the propensity to certify (H2). Foreign Buyer is statistically significant in Model 2 and Model 3, but significant at only the 5% level in the panel analysis 4 . This lack of significance may be caused by our inclusion of an industry-level diffusion variable (Diffusion of ISO 14K). Since Foreign Buyer is an industry level variable, any differential industry propensity captured by Diffusion of ISO 14K will tend to reduce its explanatory power.
We find consistent support for our hypothesis that facilities are more likely to certify when ongoing relations could raise concerns about the potential for opportunistic behavior and thereby increase the need for monitoring (H3). Both the coefficients for Industry Vertical
Relationship and for Vertically-Integrated Buyer are positive and strongly significant, suggesting that the greater the likelihood that a facility is in an ongoing vertical relationship with its buyers, the higher the propensity for ISO 14001 certification.
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, we find that facilities with an existing environmental management system (EMS) are more likely to certify in Models 1-3. A more direct test of Hypothesis 4 is provided in Model 4 of Table 3 . We use a simple probit regression to test whether facilities that certified with ISO 14001 during the years 1995 to 2001 were indeed more likely to have a functioning environmental management system (EMS). Because we have multiple observations of each facility, we correct for the fact that these observations inflate our degrees of freedom. In direct support of Hypothesis 4, we find that certified facilities are more likely to report evidence of an existing EMS.
-------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here -------------------------------------------------------------------
To analyze whether EMS adoption or ISO certification is associated with improvement (H5a and H5b), we employ a conservative differences specification (see Model 5 in Table 3 ). To form a first difference, we include current performance as a regressor in predicting next year's performance; to form a second difference, we include facility fixed effects. To allow a pretest window, we extend the panel back one year so that it now includes years from 1994 to 2001. We also include year fixed effects to control for underlying time effects.
We find that the existence of an EMS in year t is associated with significant increases in environmental performance in year t+1 (H5a). We do not find significant evidence that certification is associated with performance improvement (H5b). Thus, we have strong support that ISO 14001 provides evidence of the existence of a functioning EMS and that these systems are associated with improved performance, but we do not find evidence that certification itself is associated with performance improvement. We should be careful, however, not to commit a type-II error and confuse a lack of significance with disconfirming evidence. The short timeframe over which most organizations have been certified makes it very difficult to estimate ISO 14001 generated improvements. For now, all we can say is that a facility's certification with ISO 14001 is associated with having an EMS (both logically and statistically), and that having an EMS is itself associated with improvement.
To test Hypothesis 6, we investigate if certification acts as a signal of absolute higher environmental performance. Our certification analysis (Table 2 , Models 1-3) provides evidence that firms with lower performance have a greater propensity to certify thereby casting doubt that certification serves as a signal. To confirm this result, we regress environmental performance on ISO 14001 certification (Model 6). We again account for multiple observations of the same facility in our panel from 1995-2001. Consistent with previous results, we find that firms that have certified with ISO 14001 tend to have lower environmental performance relative to peers in their industry.
Comparing the drivers of EMS Adoption with those for ISO 14001 Certification
Returning to the analysis presented in Table 2 , we can compare the factors that lead to adoption of EMS practices with those that lead to certification with ISO 14001. In doing so, we find further support for our thesis that certification provides a means of credibly communicating with exchange partners. We also consider the explanatory power of rival theories.
Considering first the effect of our independent variables on the propensity to adopt an EMS, we find no evidence that either the need for information or the fear of opportunism encourages adoption of an EMS (see Model 3, column 1). We find no significant association between the tendency to adopt an EMS and the potential for asymmetric information (Distance to Buyer and Foreign Buyer). This result is consistent with the idea that buyers cannot effectively monitor and reward the adoption of an EMS at a supplier. We also do not find any evidence that the fear of opportunism influences EMS adoptions. Indeed, we find that suppliers that tend to have ongoing vertical relationships with their buyers (Industry Vertical Relationship and Vertically Integrated Buyer) are less likely to adopt an EMS. This result is consistent with our theory that buyers engaged in ongoing vertical relations with a supplier have reason to fear opportunism.
We find evidence (Model 3, column 1) that facilities with lower environmental performance are more likely to have an EMS -possibly because they have greater need of the performance improvements provided by an EMS. Considering only those firms that already had an EMS by 1995 (Model 3, column 2), those with lower environmental performance were more likely to certify with ISO 14001 -possibly because facilities with lower performance may feel greater need to communicate their efforts to improve. These two adverse selection processes are consistent with our finding that ISO 14001 does not act as a signal of superior performance.
We find evidence that some types of coercive pressure influence the propensity to have a functioning EMS. Regulators (Regulatory Pressure and Industry Waste Gen.) and closely connected waste treatment service providers (Offsite Waste Transfer and POTW Waste Transfer) influence a facility's propensity to have a functioning EMS. Only for Offsite Waste Transfer do we find consistent evidence of a significant association with the propensity to certify with ISO 14001. In Models 1 & 2, we find a significant association between POTW Waste Transfer and ISO 14001 certification, but the results of Model 3 seem to suggest that this finding is caused by the influence of POTWs on EMS adoption. For facilities that have adopted an EMS (Model 3, column 2), we find no evidence that POTW pressure increases the propensity to certify. One interpretation of these results is that regulators and closely connected waste service providers are able to observe the adoption of a functioning EMS, and thus do not need the information provided by ISO 14001 certification. Further evidence of this conjecture is suggested by the influence of supply chain partners in the auto industry (Auto Supplier). These important partners have strong coercive power, but cannot directly observe internal environmental management efforts. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that Auto Supplier strongly influences the propensity to certify with ISO 14001, but we find no evidence that it has a positive effect on the propensity to have an EMS.
We find some evidence that ownership structure influences certification. In two of the models, facilities that have foreign parents (Foreign Owned) are more likely to certify with ISO 14001. One possible explanation for this result is that distant facilities have greater need to communicate their actions to foreign owners. We also find that organizations with more facilities are more likely to certify. This may suggest that facilities in such organizations have greater access to resources needed for certification, or it may suggest that managers use certification to communicate hidden attributes to corporate superiors.
Finally, we find evidence that overlapping management standards may facilitate the adoption of an EMS, but mixed evidence with respect to their effect on ISO 14001 certification.
ISO 9000 Certified is significantly associated with EMS use, but evidence of a link between ISO 9000 and ISO 14001 certification is inconsistent. We find that Responsible Care Participants are more likely to adopt EMS practices, but we find no evidence that they are more likely to certify with the ISO 14001 standard. Lastly, we find evidence that the more an industry includes members of Responsible Care (RC Industry) the lower a facility's propensity to certify. This may suggest that the institutional structure provided by Responsible Care partially substitutes for that provided by ISO 14001.
DISCUSSION
In summary, we find evidence that organizations certify with ISO 14001 to reduce information asymmetries with supply chain partners. In particular, we find that suppliers with potential buyers that are distant (H1) or foreign (H2) are more likely to certify. We also find that suppliers are more likely to certify when ongoing vertical relations increase the need among potential buyers to monitor supplier behavior (H3). We find that certification provides information about the existence of an environmental management system (H4) and subsequent performance improvement (H5a), but it does not indicate relatively superior performance (H6).
Thus, we conclude that certification provides buyers with information about an ongoing supplier's performance improvement efforts.
Consistent with the predictions of new institutional theory, we find that the coercive forces of regulation and the mimetic forces of cumulative adoption influence the propensity to adopt standardized practices and to obtain certification. However, we show that certification should not be conflated with adoption. When we use statistical techniques to separate these two actions, we find evidence that coercive regulatory forces influence practice adoption, but we find no consistent evidence that they influence certification. We also find that ongoing vertical relationships reduce practice adoption but encourage certification. These results strongly suggest that the decision to certify differs from the decision to adopt underlying practices.
Our results are robust to a large number of controls and specifications. We include industry and year effects, and we use a two-stage selection model to address potential concerns about unobserved factors that might jointly influence the propensity to have an EMS and to certify with ISO 14001. We conduct robustness tests using alternative measures of important variables, and we set relatively stringent levels for evidence of a significant relationship.
Despite our conservative analysis there are reasons to interpret our findings cautiously.
Scale and chemical emission thresholds for reporting to the Toxic Release Inventory could cause a potential sample selection problem. Our sample may fail to pick up small, less polluting facilities who have certified to ISO14001. We have investigated this problem statistically and believe our results to be robust. In particular, using the Dun & Bradstreet dataset, we compared our sample with the larger population of facilities. While we find, not surprisingly, that facilities in our sample tend to be larger and from more heavily polluting industries, there is no significant difference between our sample and the overall population with respect to ISO 14001 certification. Nevertheless, we believe care should be exercised in extrapolating our findings to predict the behavior of firms of all sizes and industries.
Another potential confound is that we measure the existence of an EMS through a facility's report on pollution reduction activities. This could cause a measurement error for facilities that have an EMS in place but do not routinely make changes to production processes or that have made a number of pollution reducing improvements in the past and no longer need to further reduce pollution levels. Fortunately, the effect of this bias should be conservative, making it harder to find a relationship between adoption of an EMS and improvements in environmental performance.
Finally, ISO 14001 is still in a relatively early stage of diffusion. As more facilities certify, the profile of those seeking certification may change. In particular, as the number of ISO 14001 certifications rises, various institutional pressures may trigger adoption by initial noncertifiers. While this does not contradict our fundamental thesis that the desire to monitor and communicate about behavior is driving certification decisions, it suggests caution in extrapolating discovered adoption patterns to all temporal periods of the adoption process.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we respond to calls for greater use of strategic analysis to understand decentralized institutions. We propose that some decentralize institutions --in particular, certified management standards --may be used to reduce information asymmetries between potential exchange partners. We propose that managers think strategically about how exchange partners may react in the face of information asymmetries when deciding whether to avail themselves of the certification services provided by a private decentralized institution.
Consistent with our theory, we find that firms are more likely to seek certification when their potential exchange partners may lack credible information or fear supplier opportunism.
We provide evidence that certification provides credible information about difficult to observe organizational attributes. In particular, we confirm that certification reveals the existence of an underlying management system, and we demonstrate that such systems are associated with performance improvement. We do not find, however, any evidence that the certification process itself leads to improvement or that certification serves as a signal of superior performance.
Observing this pattern of results, one might be tempted to conclude that, while the adoption of a management system is a meaningful act, certification is a meaningless one. We disagree with such an inference and believe that a more functional and hopeful interpretation is in order. Even if certification represents a purely symbolic act, it is an act that provides real information about the existence of a management system. Indeed, our research suggests a type of "reverse decoupling" can occur. In many organizations, performance-improving EMS practices were adopted prior to the existence of ISO 14001. These organizations were able to gain external social and economic rewards for their action only after ISO 14001 provided a credible mechanism for communicating their actions. Thus, we find evidence of a kind of decoupling of substance from symbol in which substantial action precedes and for a time exceeds symbolic action. Coupling of symbol and substance then occurs after the emergence of a decentralized institution that allows credible communication.
Our research should not be interpreted to support a simplistic functionalist perspective of decentralized institutions. While our research suggests that ISO 14001 came to perform a functional role in allowing credible communication between exchange partners, this role differed significantly from that expected by many of its framers. In testimony before the Congress of the United States, many of the members of the ISO technical committee (TC 207) claimed that the institution had been designed to provide a means of credibly differentiating organizations with relatively superior environmental performance (Mazza, 1996) . Evidence of this function for ISO 14001 is directly contradicted by our empirical analysis. Thus, our research suggests that, for at least one private decentralized institution, the functionalist goals of its creators were filtered through the strategic decisions of its users, and the institution's eventual meaning and power emerged through a decentralized process of decision-making.
For policy makers and institutional change agents, our findings suggest a fundamental paradox in the design of certified management standards. Specifically, standards that include beneficial practices may seldom act as a market signal. For a certified management standard to be useful as a market signal, high performing organizations must benefit from certification, while low performers must not. If low performers gain significant operational benefits from certifying, this condition will not hold. Moreover, if supply chain partners target their incentives to organizations where improvement can be achieved most easily, they may tend to encourage the worst performers to adopt management practices and certify them to communicate their efforts to improve. Thus, our research suggests a counter-intuitive conjecture that the more the practices included in a management standard provide direct operational benefits, the less likely certification will provide a means of signaling superior performance.
We hope that future research will further explore how the use of private decentralized institutions (e.g. certified management standards) interacts with the use of private centralized institutions (e.g. firm hierarchies). While our study focuses on the potential of management standards to alleviate asymmetric information among firms, it suggests that management standards may also play a role in reducing information asymmetries within firm hierarchies. The use of firm hierarchy can reduce transaction costs, but it can also increase the risk of certain opportunistic behaviors and consequently elevate the need to monitor the behavior of internal agents (Silverman, Nickerson & Freeman, 1997; Williamson, 1985) . Our analysis suggests that certification is more common in corporations with more facilities and among facilities that are foreign owned. This may reflect the use of certification as a means of credibly communicating attributes and actions within firms.
In conclusion, the research presented in this paper validates the conjecture made by previous scholars that strategic analysis can extend understanding of decentralized institutions.
It provides evidence that strategic decisions shape the meaning and function of a certified management standard, and it shows that this realized meaning differs from that expected by some of the institution's creators. Finally, it demonstrates the need for future research to consider the varying strategic motives of agents when exploring both the function of other decentralized institutions and the interaction of different institutional forms. 
